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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
Ins. Co., 312 Ill. 525, held that the contraction of typhoid fever may be regarded
as accidental if the disease is contracted by accidental means. In Frankamp v.
Fordney Hotel, 222 Mich. 525, an accident is defined to mean an unforeseen
event occurring without the will or design of the person whose mere act causes
it. That case specifically held that the contraction of typhoid fever from drink-
ing water was an accidental injury. Other cases in accord are Ames v. Lake
Independence Lumber Co., 226 Mich. 83; Wiltfong v. Lake Independent Lumber
Co., 226 Mich, 91; Brodin's Case, 124 Me. 162; Vennen v. New Dells Co., 161
Wis. 370; Wasmuth-Endicott v. Karst, 77 Ind. App. 279. Two cases, contra,
State ex rel Fairbault Woolen Mills et al. v. District Court of Rice County,
138 Minn. 210, and Industrial Commission v. Cross, 104 Ohio St. 561, can be
distinguished because of differences in the Workmen's Compensation Acts under
which they were decided. It would seem to follow that the case of John Riss-
man & Son v. Industrial Commission, the instant case, is decided on well es-
tablished principles and is in accord with modern decisions. F. A. E. '28.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs-LIABILITY FOR ToRTs-PRoxIMATE CAusF-Plain-
tiff was riding a bicycle. The wheel of a passing truck dropped into a hole in
the cartway causing mud to splash in the plaintiff's eyes. Small stones in the
mud penetrated the plaintiff's eye and caused loss of sight of the eye. Held, in
an action against the city, that the defect in the street caused the passing ve-
hicle to splash the mud in the plaintiff's eye, that such defect was the proximate
cause of the injury, and that the city was liable. Stemmler v. City of Pittsburgh,
(1926) 287 Pa. 365, 135 Atl. 100.
This case is interesting because of the indirect nature of city's liability.
Municipal corporations are bound to keep streets in reasonably safe condition.
Failing to do so makes them liable for all injuries due to such negligence. Bas-
sett v. St. Joseph, 53 Mo. 290. In Twist v. City of Rochester, 55 N. Y. S. 850,
the court held that a city must use reasonable care in keeping its streets safe
for public use, and if any injury results to a traveller it cannot claim exemption
from liability because its streets are public. Authorities are practically uniform
in holding a city liable for injuries resulting from its negligence in failing to
keep streets in repair even though the defective street was not the sole cause
of the injury. Belleville v. Hoffman, 74 Ill. App. 503. Thus a city was liable
where the injury was produced as a result partly of a defect in the street, and
partly of nature of the accident. Lacon v. Page, 48 Ill. 499; Vogel v. City of
West Plains, 73 Mo. App. 588; Barrett v. Savannah, 9 Ga. App. 642, 72 S. E. 49;
Vogelsan v. City of St. Louis, 139 Mo. 127, 40 S. W. 653. In Joliet v. Shufelt,
144 Ili. 403, 32 N. E. 969, the city was held liable where a street was negli-
gently constructed and plaintiff was thrown from his buggy and injured even
though the accident would not have occurred if the horses's harness had not
broken. If, however, the injuries are a result of a collision with a fire-truck
the city is not liable although a defect in the street contributed to the collision.
City of Louisville v. Bridwell, 150 Ky. 589, 150 S. W. 672; Or if the plaintiff's
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury there can be no recovery
against the city even though the street was defective. De Camp v. Sioux City,
74 Ia. 392, 37 N. W. 971. E. C. F. '27.
NEGLIGENCE-MOTOR VEHICLES-DUTY OwED By DRIVER TO SELF-INITED
GuEsT.-The plaintiff in this case was a widow who was employed in Pine Bluff.
The defendant was going to Little Rock by automobile and the plaintiff, who
was anxious to see her children living there, obtained the defendant's permis-
sion to accompany him. The testimony introduced by the plaintiff tended to
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